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Thomas Reid remarked that we hardly ever attend to the visible ap-
pearance of objects, but that our attention is normally drawn to the
objects themselves and those features of them which best ﬁt our in-
tentions and interests.1 For example, I can with a cursory glance
take in the lavender bush at the end of my street, some ﬁfty metres
away, and note the overall colour of the bush—a dull green at this
time of year—and its rough, somewhat square, shape. But it takes
more attention, reﬂection and skill to move beyond this description
and to discover the distinctive ways in which these objects can ap-
pear to me. I may note, for example, that the lavender bush appears
more ﬂattened than the garden hedge some mere ten metres from
me. Or it may strike me that the distinctions that I can make among
the branches of the lavender bush are a matter of the pattern of
shading across its apparent surface while for the hedge each branch
stands out distinctly.
Many diﬀerent trades and professions seek to reﬁne the skills of
attention and articulation required in order to discern and express
the ways in which things can appear. Over many generations, paint-
ers have developed skills for attending to the particular appearances
of objects at diﬀerent distances and in diﬀerent lights in order better
to depict them. Attention to colour and form is as much a concern
of designers and producers of decoration as of painters, and it is also
a skill useful for those engaged into research on visual cognition.
What holds for the visual case is as true, perhaps even more so, for
other sense modalities: perfumers and brewers have an obvious in-
terest in treating the appearances of smell and taste as complex and
diﬀerentiable.
These observations on the diﬃculty in attending to the appear-
ances of objects contrast with an assumption common in philo-
1.  (Reid  ()), Ch. , sect. III.
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sophical discussions of perception and consciousness: that
appearances—both the ways things appear to one to be and one’s
state of mind of being appeared to in such ways—are obvious to
one. This assumption is present in much of the discussion of qualia
and consciousness, where it is often suggested that one can do no
more than indicate to the reader the obvious presence of such quali-
ties.2 When Thomas Nagel challenges the explanatory pretensions of
physicalism by denying that we could know what it is like to be a bat,
his background assumption is that we all do know what it is like to
be human, and exercise the sensory faculties we have.3 Arguably, the
assumption is also at work in the theory of knowledge. In diﬀerent
ways, both A.J. Ayer and Roderick Chisholm appeal either to ap-
pearances or judgements about appearance as the foundations of
empirical knowledge.4 Such foundationalism, with its assumption
that there are judgements which can stand both as the basis of em-
pirical knowledge but which themselves are beyond defeat, is now
unfashionable. Yet few are prepared to challenge the thought that
one cannot go wrong when one restricts one’s judgements simply to
a report of appearances. Rather, it is more common to challenge the
idea that such restrictive judgements could act as a basis for the rest
of one’s body of knowledge. So, it is common to think that thoughts
about one’s own perceptual states are easy to arrive at, and not par-
ticularly susceptible to error.
The contrast is such that one might at ﬁrst think that the actual
method of those who have a practical interest in appearances simply
contradicts the assumptions of those who merely theorise about
them. But this is merely a seeming contradiction: we can reformu-
late the philosophers’ claims to be quite consistent with the actual
practice of those who have an interest in attending to how things ap-
pear to them. The philosophers’ assumptions about the obviousness
of appearance properly only relate to the move from having attend-
ed to some object, some feature of it, or how either appears to one,
to knowledge of how it is for one when things so appear. The skills
that the artist, the perfume-maker, or the psychologist nurture give
each a richer hoard of elements of experience to enjoy or scrutinise
than the rest of us. In some cases such learning may even lead to a
diﬀerence in how one experiences the world rather than just a dif-
2.  Cf. Ned Block: ‘…what is it that philosophers have called qualitative states?: As Louis Arm-
strong said when asked what jazz is, “If you got to ask, you ain’t never going to get to know.”’,
in (Block ), p..
3.  (Nagel ).
4.  For the former see (Ayer ), and (Ayer ), Ch.; for the latter see (Chisholm ),
Ch. and (Chisholm ).
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ference in what one knows of how one experiences the world: some-
one so skilled may be able to make ﬁner discriminations than the
rest of us. A theorist can quite consistently accept that such experts
have both greater powers of discrimination among objects in the
world and better developed powers of attention to aspects of how
things appear, while claiming that the reﬂective move, from atten-
tion to the features of objects to knowledge of what it is like for one
so to be aware of those features, is the same for all of us. One’s reﬂ-
ective judgement about how one’s own state of mind is grounded is
explained in the same way for all: as being grounded in what is obvi-
ous to such reﬂection.
However, there is something paradoxical here, nonetheless. For if
we look simply to the disputes among philosophers we ﬁnd substan-
tive debate about the nature of appearances. Some philosophers
claim that we have visual sensations, that there is more to what our
visual perceptions of the world are like than the presentation of visi-
ble objects and features in the world around us. Others insist that
our experience of the world is transparent or diaphanous, that there
is no more to be introspected in this than the world as it is presented
to us. Some philosophers claim that we perceive non-physical enti-
ties in virtue of which we perceive the world around us. Others insist
that perception of the physical environment is direct or immediate.
Some philosophers claim that perception is intentional, akin to be-
lief or judgement in being about or representing the environment
around us. Others insist that they can make no sense of this, that
there is all the diﬀerence in the world between feeling and thinking.
While not all of these disputes are framed in terms of claims about
appearances, most, if not all, of these positions put forward claims
about perceptual experience or what it is like consciously to appre-
hend the world around us. These various proposals concerning con-
scious experience conﬂict with each other.
Now if we take seriously the thought that appearances really are
just obvious to one—or obvious given a bit of reﬂection—then it
should be puzzling how there can be such disagreement. For surely
the slightest amount of thought will reveal that a given account is
correct or incorrect. The persistence of dispute would seem to indi-
cate that at least one of the parties is confused, or that the character
of philosophers’ inner lives is far more varied than we previously
had reason to suspect.
This is no mere idle puzzle. Nor should we take it as simply a sign
that either the conception of appearances in play or the debate
about them is something just not in good order. Rather, it reﬂects
something at the heart of the problem of perception, something
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which is rarely made fully articulate in discussion of it. It has be-
come fairly standard to present the problem of perception as prima-
rily a problem about our knowledge of the world around us, where
such knowledge is derived from the senses. While discussions of
perception are commonly framed within the context of an attempt
to give an explanation of our knowledge of the common place—my
knowledge that there are more than twenty houses on my street;
that there are two coﬀee cups on the table; that there is traﬃc in the
street—the real problem here is one concerning our knowledge of
our own minds. What sense can we make of conscious perceptual
experience as it reveals itself to us through introspection?
Perceptual awareness of the world around us and of one’s own
body provides the paradigm example of episodic, or phenomenal
consciousness. When one comes to reﬂect on what it is like so to be
conscious, and to be aware of the world, one comes to reﬂect on
such perceptual consciousness. The various debates about the na-
ture of perception, or the objects of perception, or states of percep-
tual experience, disagree about what is to be said about such
perceptual consciousness. At the same time, most of these accounts
assume that phenomenal consciousness per se is open to immediate
reﬂection such that the deﬁning truths about it should simply be
obvious to us. Yet, the very fact that such dispute can be sustained
indicates that such an assumption is questionable. And in rejecting
this assumption, we will need to mark a distinction between the real
nature of appearances—states of being appeared to in a certain
way—and how those states seem to us, even if such a distinction
may sound paradoxical to some ears. Moreover, as we shall see, we
can only properly understand the debate about perceptual con-
sciousness, once we recognise that the various views of it are com-
mitted to supposing that appearances may mislead us not only
about the world around us, but also about themselves.
In this paper I want to set the above set of concerns within the
historical context of the developments within Anglophone discus-
sions of the problems of perception. One can easily gain the impres-
sion from the slightest acquaintance with writings about the
problems of perception that there has been a marked change in the
ways in which the problems are formulated, and competing theories
are presented. If we go back only as far as debates around the middle
of the twentieth century, we ﬁnd such a striking shift in the terms of
the debate and assumptions that are brought to bear that it becomes
too diﬃcult to discern what continuity, if any, there is in the debate.
This presents us with a genuine problem of interpretation: how are
we to make intelligible to ourselves the past history of debate?
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I shall seek to show that this apparent discontinuity and apparent
unintelligibility are simply symptoms of the more general issue we
have raised here. How can there be dispute about the nature of per-
ceptual consciousness, if the nature of such consciousness is sup-
posed simply to be obvious to one given the slightest reﬂection? We
can make best sense of the diﬀerent positions here by understanding
them in the light of a rather diﬀerent conception of perceptual con-
sciousness than is currently favoured. Both traditional sense-datum
accounts of object-perception and recent theories of perceptual ex-
perience as an intentional phenomenon stand opposed to a suppos-
edly crude form of naïve realism about perception. Naïve realism is
taken by both traditions to be falsiﬁed by considerations about the
existence of illusion. The diﬀerent traditions that have developed
show continuity in the centrality of this problem. The striking dif-
ferences between them can be explained in terms of the diﬀerent in-
tellectual contexts of debate in early modern times, at the beginning
of the century and more recently.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, I lay out the problem of interpreta-
tion more exactly. In trying to make sense of the traditional debate,
we then need to look in more detail at formulations of the argument
from illusion, here Hume’s discussion in An Enquiry concerning Hu-
man Understanding provides a useful stalking horse; in the sections
which follow I argue that the standard explanations of such forms of
argument are inadequate to the task of making intelligible the de-
bates of the past. In the ﬁnal section, I ﬁrst sketch an alternative way
of making sense of the argument from illusion as it has developed in
the sense-datum tradition, and then on the back of that propose a
diﬀerent way of seeing the development of the debate.
1.  A Discontinuity in the Debate 
A remarkable shift has taken place in Anglophone discussion of per-
ception over the twentieth century. For much of the early part of
that century, and for some time in the latter half, discussion of per-
ception focused on the existence or nature of immediate objects of
perception which could not be identiﬁed with physical or public ob-
jects of perception. J.L. Austin begins his lectures Sense & Sensibilia
with the following rather withering assessment of the content of
that debate:
The general doctrine… [that] we never see otherwise perceive (or
“sense”), or anyhow never directly perceive or sense, material objects
(or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impres-
sions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts etc.)… is a typically scholas-
tic view, attributable, ﬁrst, to an obsession with a few particular
words, the uses of which are over-simpliﬁed, not really understood
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or carefully studied or correctly described; and second to an obses-
sion with a few (and nearly always the same) half-studied “facts”.5
Austin’s intention here is not just to reject the doctrine that there
are sense-data, but rather to dismiss the terms of the whole debate.
Yet the problems he seeks to dismiss are ones that had preoccupied
such ﬁgures as Russell, Moore, Broad, Price, and Ayer.6 That debate
focused on a conﬂict between so-called Naïve Realism, sometimes
alleged to be the view of common sense concerning perception and
its objects, and a more philosophically and scientiﬁcally sophisticat-
ed alternative, which was answerable to the discoveries of Enlighten-
ment science, labelled, Representative Realism.7 The turning point
of such disputes concerns the clash between common sense views
concerning the objects of perception and their characteristics and
certain fairly evident reﬂections concerning the possibility of per-
ceptual illusions or hallucinations. The latter considerations are of-
ten grouped together under the heading of ‘the argument from
illusion’.
The debate between Naïve Realism and Representative Realism
can be traced back at least as far as Hume, though its main tropes
are already present in Berkeley.8 The argument from illusion, or the
closely related argument from conﬂicting appearances (which
avoids denigrating any appearance as illusory or privileging any as
veridical) is more ancient: traces of it are found in the earliest frag-
ments we have of Greek philosophy, and it plays a central role in Pla-
to’s Theaetetus.9 Nevertheless, Austin took his task to show us how
5.  (Austin ), pp. -.
6.  For example, see (Russell ), Ch.; also The Philosophy of Logical Atomism; (Moore ),
(Moore ); (Broad ), Chs. VII, VIII, (Broad ), Ch.IV, (Broad ); (Price ),
(Price ). For Ayer’s construal of the debate see (Ayer ), Chs. - and (Ayer ), Ch.V.
It is common to take Ayer as representative of the whole tradition (as indeed Austin does), but
in fact Ayer’s work involves a substantial revision of key assumptions common to Moore, Rus-
sell, Broad and Price. (For more on this see my ‘Austin and the Sense-Datum Tradition’ (forth-
coming).) Although the debate about sense-data predominantly took place in Britain, there
are similarities with it in some US debate: cf. (Lewis ), and Roderick Firth’s discussion of
the whole debate in (Firth ).
7.  One should also include idealism and later phenomenalism as among the parties to this dis-
pute—typically defenders of such a bold metaphysical view of the nature of empirical reality
saw themselves as holding on to the claims of common sense while paying due respect to the
arguments of indirect realism. There are also important connections with discussions within
the phenomenological tradition, particularly in some works of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty although the role of realism within the Anglophone tradition bears a problematic rela-
tion to the setting of the phenomenological debate.
8.  Berkeley is also the source of idealism, and Hume in the Treatise has been taken, by Herbert
Price and Norman Kemp Smith in particular, as inspiration for phenomenalism.
9.  See, for example, the discussion in (Burnyeat ).
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we could:
… rid ourselves of such illusions as ‘the argument from illusion’—
an ‘argument’ which those (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Russell, Ayer) who
have been most adept at working it, most fully masters of a certain
special, happy style of blinkering philosophical English, have all
themselves felt somehow to be spurious.10
If one contrasts the writings of Russell or Ayer with recent discus-
sions of perception, one might think that, simply as a matter of in-
tellectual history, Austin has been remarkably successful in his
crusade.11 Where the argument from illusion could once have been
seen as the arch under which all debate about perception would take
place, no such structure has replaced it in recent discussion. Indeed,
the argument itself is often now used as an example for ﬁrst-year
students of how not to construct philosophical positions.
Austin himself was sceptical of oﬀering any illuminating philo-
sophical account of perception. But philosophical theorising about
such issues has not gone away. Rather, accounts which predominate
now are those which view the states of mind one has when perceiv-
ing—perceptual experiences—as analogous to beliefs, or judge-
ments or desires as being about something and being so in virtue of
how they represent the world. Such, for example, is suggested by
Tyler Burge in the following passage:
I begin with the premiss that our perceptual experience represents or
is about objects, properties, and relations that are objective. That is
to say, their nature (or essential character) is independent of any one
person’s actions, dispositions, or mental phenomena. An obvious
consequence of this is that individuals are capable of having percep-
tual representations that are misperceptions or hallucinations…12
We might call this kind of approach an Intentional Theory of Percep-
tion. Theories of this kind have been promoted by, among others
D.M. Armstrong, G.E.M. Anscombe, John Searle, and Christopher
Peacocke.13 For proponents of such views, the idea that one’s experi-
ence might be veridical or illusory, correct or incorrect, is just built
into the conception of experience as intentional. That is, it is
10. Op. cit. p. .
11. Putnam claims, however, that Austin’s eﬀect was at best cosmetic, ruling out any appeal to
terms such as ‘sense=data’ or ‘impressions’ but not a general appeal to such intermediaries—
see (Putnam ).
12. (Burge ), p..
13. Cf. (Armstrong ), Ch.; (Anscombe ); (Searle ), Ch.; (Peacocke ), and
(Peacocke ), Ch. . One can also add to the list: Fred Dretske, (Dretske ), Ch. ; (Dret-
ske ); Gilbert Harman, (Harman ); Ruth Millikan, (Millikan );and Sydney Shoe-
maker, (Shoemaker ); and Michael Tye, (Tye ), (Tye ).
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claimed that it is part of our conception of such experience that it is
directed on to the world in such a way that its being so is no guaran-
tee that the world is as it is experienced. So the argument from illu-
sion can present no special problem about sense perception. At best,
it can only point us to the intentionality of this state of mind. Such
writers often present the view they defend as one which their readers
can see as being obviously good sense or correct, and hence they im-
ply that the traditional problem is no problem at all: it has simply
been dissolved as a ‘pseudo-problem’.
However, one might think that there is a sense in which Austin
and others who have been critical of the debate about direct percep-
tion have also been just too successful in their critique. For in con-
vincing us that there is no real problem of perception concerning
the direct objects of perception and the status of sense-data, they
have left us with a rather diﬀerent, and in the end potentially more
intractable, problem. If the assumptions which fuelled centuries of
debate are themselves so obviously inadequate, one may wonder
why the debate itself should have survived. As Burnyeat puts the
point:
What emerges… is a typical philosophical problem. I do not mean
the problem of deciding what does follow from the premiss that ap-
pearances conﬂict. For the answer to that question, I believe, is that
nothing follows: nothing of any epistemological signiﬁcance at all.
The problem rather is to discover why so many conﬂicting conclu-
sions have been thought to follow. Why have some philosophers
been so impressed, while others like Austin, remain unimpressed, by
the familiar fact that appearances conﬂict? What assumptions, spo-
ken or unspoken, are at work to make the familiar fact seem prob-
lematic?14
The shift of perspective on these issues has been so remarkable that
we are in danger of ﬁnding the past debate simply unintelligible.
What was once taken as a compelling argument is now taken as pat-
ently fallacious; what was once seen as the central problem is now
seen as no problem at all. One might be Whiggish about such
things, of course, and simply take this to be evidence of progress
within philosophy. But even the mildest scepticism about the pow-
ers of human reason should lead one to wonder at how recent and
sudden the shift has been. Is it not more reasonable to think that the
seeming unintelligibility of past debate may rather be a symptom of
something else? That is indeed what I shall argue to be the case. The
shift reﬂects our initial puzzle, namely that we have here a debate
14. Op. cit. p..
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about the nature of appearance. The gulf between earlier debates
and current ones seems so unbridgeable because on either side we
have diﬀerent assumptions about what is obvious about the nature
of perceptual appearance. Making good that claim and making
sense of how that can be will in turn unearth a deep continuity be-
tween the traditional debate and more recent concerns.
To justify this claim, we need to look ﬁrst at a concrete example
of a form of argument which no longer looks remotely compelling
to us. Our task here is to understand how anyone might have been
moved to put forward just such an argument, rather than simply to
criticise the arguments proposed. I shall ﬁrst present an argument
drawn from Hume, note certain puzzles concerning it and then con-
sider two strategies of explaining why Hume should have put it for-
ward as he did.
2.  The Argument from Illusion
Although even a cursory reading of past discussions of sense-data
and perception reveal the importance of the so-called ‘argument
from illusion’, it is in fact diﬃcult to ﬁnd an explicit statement of the
argument as an argument. This has led some philosophers to sug-
gest that strictly there is no such argument, but rather a set of con-
siderations which place a duty of explanation on any theory of
perception or thought.15
Such a claim would be an over-statement if it were taken to mean
that there are no examples of these considerations put forward as
straightforward arguments. For we can ﬁnd such in the work of, for
instance, Hume, Russell and Ayer.16 However, when we look at what
is presented as supposed argument, it is often diﬃcult to determine
what its exact form is, or to identify the premisses or mode of rea-
soning involved. It is this problem which indicates the real diﬃculty
in interpreting past debate.
Given that the reasoning in question is supposed to lead us to an
avowedly surprising conclusion, we should expect each step of the
argument to be clear and obvious, and the mode of reasoning to be
15. Cf. Dummett, ‘We commonly employ a distinction between how things appear and how
they really are; and it is therefore natural to push this distinction to its limit. This seems to me
the best way in which to view the so-called “argument from illusion”. If this is regarded as an
argument, properly so called, with premisses and a conclusion, it is diﬃcult to make out what
are the premisses and what the conclusion. Rather, it is a starting-point.’ From (Dummett
), p..
16. (Hume ), sec. XII; (Russell ), Ch.; (Ayer ), Ch.. This point is pressed home
forcefully in (Snowdon ). Snowdon’s discussion forcefully presses the need to provide a
proper interpretation of the debate about the direct objects of perception, and the discussion
here is indebted to it, although the strategy of interpretation diverges.
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unquestionable. For otherwise, when faced with an unpalatable
conclusion, we are as liable to reject one of the premisses, or the
mode of reasoning used to arrive at the conclusion, as to submit to
the conclusion. Where the argument is inexplicit, its suasive force
becomes hidden and it is rendered more obscure why someone
should have thought there was a genuine argument or justiﬁcation
for the claim. So the need to explain what is really involved in this
kind of reasoning becomes more pressing.
This is well illustrated by Hume’s use of the argument in his ﬁrst
Enquiry. The argument is presented in the context of Hume’s scepti-
cism with regard to the senses, a form of scepticism he considers to
be more profound than either ancient scepticism or that deriving
from Descartes. His argument has two parts: in the ﬁrst he outlines
what he takes to be the view of the common man concerning the ob-
jects of perception and our relation to them, beliefs which we all
hold as a matter of our nature:
…when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they
always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the ex-
ternal objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are
nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we
see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist independent of
our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which
perceives it.17
This view he takes to be destroyed by ‘the slightest philosophy’. In its
place, one is compelled by reason to adopt a ‘philosophical’ theory
of perception and its objects which admits a distinction between the
external, mind-independent objects of perception, and the mind-
dependent images or impressions which are present to the mind and
which represent those external objects. This latter view is not a natu-
ral one, but recommended solely by reason in the face of the failure
of our common sense beliefs. Hume’s slightest philosophy is a form
of the argument from illusion, and he uses it against the view he
takes to be that of common sense. At the same time, he employs
sceptical reasoning against the philosophical view, familiar from
Berkeley’s attack on his predecessors. It is the combination of these
two criticisms that Hume takes to establish scepticism with regard
to the senses.
The form of Hume’s challenge is ﬁrst to ﬁnd an error in our
common sense beliefs concerning perception, and then to show that
there is no reason to accept any positive philosophical account
which can be put in its place. Hume’s characterisation of the views
17. Op. cit. pp.-.
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of the vulgar can be seen as the origin of Naïve or Direct Realism, in
the sense discussed in the twentieth century debates about sense-da-
ta; while the ‘philosophical theory’ is the origin in such discussions
of Representative or Indirect Realism. Hume’s sceptical challenge
presents us with the origin of the assumption that Representative
Realism faces a particular sceptical challenge involving ‘a veil of ide-
as’. The argument from illusion, as Hume uses it, is an attempt to
show that our common sense views of perception, as Hume con-
ceives of them, are evidently false. However, when one comes to the
swiftly developed argument intended to show this, one ﬁnds that the
epithet ‘slightest philosophy’ may be thought appropriate for more
than one reason:
…the slightest philosophy… teaches us, that nothing can ever be
present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses
are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, with-
out being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the
mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as
we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independ-
ent of us, suﬀers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its im-
age, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of
reason; and no man, who reﬂects, ever doubted, that the existences,
which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing
but perceptions in the mind, and ﬂeeting copies or representations
of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.18
Clearly there are problems here both with the example Hume uses,
and with how Hume uses the example in order to extract his conclu-
sion.
From what he says it is clear that Hume wishes to treat the view-
ing of the table as an example of illusory perception, one in which
the table appears to be changing in size when commonsensically we
would judge it to be stable in size. But although he treats it as fairly
evident that this is a case of illusion, as Reid was ready to point out,
that assumption actually falsiﬁes the character of our experience.19
While Hume is right to think that there is an alteration in how one
sees the table, and indeed in how the table looks, it is not obvious
that this alteration is in any way illusory. The alteration in the look
of the table is now commonly called its apparent size, and it is a
well-documented fact that the apparent size of objects alters relative
to one’s viewing position. But it is also as commonly documented
that they appear to have a constant size when one moves away from
18.  Loc. cit.
19.  (Reid ), Essay Two, Ch. , pp.-.
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them: so that in such experience we both have the size the table ap-
pears to have, and its apparent size, the former remains constant,
the latter alters. We have been given no reason to suppose that it is
the latter feature which is the appearance of the size of the table
rather than the former. And hence, we have not yet been given rea-
son to suppose that this counts genuinely as an illusory aspect of the
experience.
There is much to be said about the relation between apparent
size and the size that something can appear to have, and diﬀerent
emphases will be given depending on whether one has a treatise for
painters interested in perspective, or works on the psychology of
shape and size perception. The question of most concern to us is
why Hume should so readily be prepared to take the example as one
of obvious illusion or conﬂicting appearance, when it is not at all ev-
ident that it is such an illusion. In part, the answer may simply re-
side in the context in which he wrote. One can ﬁnd other authors,
both philosophers and non-philosophers, who are prepared to de-
scribe the case in just this way. For the examples of visual perception
of size and shape were often taken to be the locus of an issue con-
cerning the relation between retinal stimulation, the occurrence of
visual sensation and the role of judgement in discerning either the
shape or size of an object.20 Hume’s anticipated reader might be ex-
pected already to have a theoretically sensitive attitude towards what
he or she could introspect. But that thought should already raise the
suspicion that we should not suppose that Hume’s argument simply
relies on some evident, or supposedly evident, truths concerning
perception from which he will go on to draw surprising conclusions.
On the other hand, at this point we can extract nothing further from
his text which might explain why he could expect us to accept his
description of the situation. This should make us suspicious of
treating the passage at face value as presenting a genuine piece of
straight forward reasoning.
Nevertheless, while this failing in Hume’s reasoning is worthy of
comment, it is not the most serious problem with the argument. For
there are genuine illusions which parallel Hume’s example. Viewing
with one eye through an aperture into an Ames room can lead to
distorted judgements of size: with the table positioned in one corner
of the room, it may appear much, much larger than it really is;
while, when placed in the other corner, it may seem much, much
smaller. In this case we have an example in which the table will seem
20. See for example, (Malebranche ), (Locke ); for a review of seventeenth and eight-
eenth century theories see (Morgan ).
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to have a size other than it has, in addition to having an apparent
size. Even though Hume’s own example may not be convincing, we
can easily substitute a case of visual illusion which will provide the
needed premisses. For the moment we can bracket the puzzle of why
Hume should be conﬁdent in his choice of example, and instead see
how his argument is intended to develop from a similar case of un-
disputed illusion.
Having described the case in terms of illusion, Hume immediate-
ly draws his conclusion, ‘it was, therefore, nothing but [the table’s]
image, which was present to the mind.’ This conclusion includes
both a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that an
image of the table, whatever that is to amount to, is present to the
observer’s mind. The negative claim is that the table itself is not
present to the mind. Although we have the appearance here of argu-
ment, an indicated premiss concerning a case of illusion, and a con-
clusion drawn as such, in fact we lack the argument proper itself. No
additional reasons are oﬀered to support the conclusions drawn,
apart from the supposition that how the table looks is not how it is.
This failing is what is liable to prompt the charge that, strictly
speaking, there is no argument from illusion. An author may indi-
cate an example of illusion as relevant to the claims he or she wishes
to make about the nature of perception, but he or she oﬀers no ex-
plicit means for us to move reasonably to that claim from the obser-
vations with which he or she starts. Of course, that is not to say that
we cannot interpret the implicit argument lying behind what is giv-
en explicitly as reasoning. It is common to think that in such a case
there has been a move from a claim about how to the perceiver
things appear to be, to a claim about how things are in so appearing.
Commonly, such a move is interpreted as either involving a piece of
fallacious reasoning, or as relying on some further assumption
which is less than obvious. The argument is then treated as simply
fallacious or question begging.
If we are simply to ask whether we should accept as a piece of
persuasive reasoning Hume’s argument or some such similar argu-
ments to be found in Russell, or Ayer, or Price, then such criticisms
seem apt. The arguments do not seem to be good arguments to us
now, nor ought they to be treated as good. On the other hand, as a
matter of intellectual history, the argument poses us the deep prob-
lem that Burnyeat notes. Given that the argument seems so patently
inadequate to us, the question becomes one of understanding why
anyone should have put it forward as a good one. With this question
of interpretation in mind, neither of the common accounts of the
argument is at all satisfactory. For neither is adequate to explain why
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what is obvious to us should not be obvious to past thinkers, nor
why what they thought should be obvious is so obscure to us now.
3.  The Intentional Fallacy
The charge that there is a fallacy of reasoning here is to be found
most commonly in expositions of what I have labelled the inten-
tional theory of perception. When we look to cases of belief or
thought in general, we ﬁnd it fairly evident that our beliefs or
thoughts can be true or false. A child may believe that there are
sweets in the Smarties tube, even though there are only pencils there.
If the child is more than four years old, she should herself be able to
recognise the possibility of error here. Few of us are inclined to re-
spond to this situation by denying that error is really possible.21 It is
entirely implausible to suppose that when someone falsely believes
there to be sweets in the tube when there are pencils, then the belief
in question is really about something other than the tube before the
believer, or about something other than sweets as they may be found
in the eager palms of infants. We take it that it is simply in the nature
of beliefs, and thoughts in general, that they can be correct or incor-
rect concerning how things are in the world.
This assumption about the nature of belief is reﬂected in our as-
criptions of belief. In ascribing a belief we often wish to indicate
how a person takes the world to be, without committing ourselves
to the world being so. Given that, we want to accept that
(B) Mary believes that there are sweets in the tube before her
may be true without it also being true that there are in fact sweets in
the tube before Mary. So in some circumstances, we wish to accept
(B) as true without,
(B) There are sweets believed by Mary to be in the tube before
her
also being true. Hence, we consider it a mistake of reasoning, if any-
one is inclined to accept (B) simply on the basis of (B). There are
parallels here with certain other kinds of statement, for example, ac-
ceptance of (P) need not lead one to accept (P):
 (P) It is probable that there are ﬁfteen people in the next room.
(P) There are ﬁfteen people of whom it is probable that they are
in the next room.
And it is somewhat controversial whether the following inference is
21.  ‘Few’ should be used advisedly here—among exceptions we might include Parmenides
who seems to have denied that false thought is possible and one can ﬁnd in Plato’s Theaetetus
and Sophist a concern with challenges to the claim that one’s sayings or thoughts can really be
false. For an illuminating discussion of these matters see (Denyer ).
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valid:22
(M) It is possible that Mary could own a donkey
(M) There is a donkey which Mary could own
So in general, we have learned to be highly suspicious of any such
move. No philosopher now is liable to think that such a transition is
simply obviously correct without further comment. Although it is a
more controversial matter whether in each of these cases we can ﬁnd
a common form and hence in the cases where the inference fails,
one kind of fallacy in accepting the second of the pair on the basis of
the ﬁrst.23
Therefore one might interpret Hume so. He attempts to reach his
positive conclusion by moving from
(A) It appears to David as if there is a small rhomboid before
him.
to
(A) There is a small rhomboid which appears to David to be be-
fore him.
(A) is not yet the conclusion that Hume wishes to arrive at: that an
image, impression or some other mind-dependent entity is present
to the mind. But we can see how ancillary reasoning might make
one accept that further claim, once one has arrived at (A). Ex hy-
pothesi, the table in the room is not a small rhomboid, and further-
more the case can be set up so that there is no other public object
which is an appropriate candidate to be apparent to David. If some
small rhomboid is apparent to him, it is something other than a
public object. The suggestion that it is an image which must be
present to him, may then be taken as the best explanation of why
(A) should be true in this case.
Whatever one thinks of the latter move, it is fairly evident that
the move from (A) to (A) is suspect. Moreover, if one thinks that
perceptual states, that is states of being appeared to, just are exam-
ples of intentional states of mind, then one may well think that the
error in moving from (A) to (A) just is that from moving from
(B) to (B). Indeed, when we look to proponents of intentional the-
ories of perception, we can ﬁnd them diagnosing the errors of the
22. The validity of this inference normally holds in systems containing the Converse Barcan
Formula, but whether that principle reﬂects our common conception of modality is a matter
of some controversy.
23.  It might be tempting to treat all these examples as presenting problems of the same form.
We could see each as involving what Russell would call a scope fallacy: we have a simpler sen-
tence embedded within an operator: the move is then from OaSomeF to SomeFOa; such a
move is not valid even for many truth-functional operators, and in none of these cases is the
operator a truth-function. However, there are no agreed uniform diagnoses of these diﬀerent
contexts, and diﬀerent accounts have been oﬀered of modal and epistemic contexts.
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sense-datum tradition as involving just such misconceptions about
intentionality.
For example, we have G.E.M. Anscombe writing shortly after Aus-
tin’s lectures:
…both [sides of the debate] misunderstand verbs of perception, be-
cause these verbs are intentional or essentially have an intentional as-
pect. The ﬁrst position misconstrues intentional objects as material
objects of sensation; the other allows only material objects of sensa-
tion…24
While a slightly diﬀerent diagnosis is oﬀered some twenty years later
in Searle’s defence of his own rather diﬀerent version of the inten-
tional theory of perception:
I want to argue that the traditional sense data theorists were correct
in recognizing that we have experiences, visual or otherwise, but
they mislocated the Intentionality of perception in supposing that
experiences were the objects of perception…25
The accusation that sense-datum theorists and others who take the
argument seriously must be confused about the intentionality of ex-
perience can be found also in Gilbert Harman, Michael Tye and
Ruth Millikan, among others.26
I do not want here to criticise either the various accounts of per-
ception that these authors wish to promote in their criticisms of the
argument from illusion or the sense-datum theory of perception.
Nor do I want to promote Hume’s argument, or any variants of it.
However, it should be fairly clear that these criticisms of the argu-
ment, if aimed partly at understanding past uses of the argument
from illusion as well as simply repudiating it, are plainly inadequate.
For the errors of reasoning that these authors impute to past propo-
nents of the argument are very obvious ones. If we simply reﬂect on
the parallel examples for cases other than perception, we can see
that we have little inclination to accept the move as valid. Either we
are inclined straight oﬀ to reject it, or at least to see it as questiona-
ble. If there is no more to the argument then asking us to make a
move we ﬁnd so mistaken in the other cases, then the suggestion is
simply that the argument’s proponents are making an obviously fal-
lacious move.
The claim here is not the pessimistic one that there is never
progress in philosophical thought; nor is it the optimistic one that
human powers of reasoning are such that we are never in the sway of
24. (Anscombe ), p. in reprint Collected Papers, vol. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ).
25.  (Searle ), p..
26.  (Harman ); (Tye ); (Millikan ).
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illusions of thought or false pictures which take time and persever-
ance to overcome. It is no doubt true that in the past and in the
present, there has been much philosophical reasoning about
thought, representation and perception which comes to exhibit the
kind of mistake suggested above. The problem is not so much with
the imputation of error, but with the imputation of what is now, for
us at least, so obvious an error, or at the very least so obviously a
questionable move. The story as told so far identiﬁes an error, but
does not have the resources with which to explain why past thinkers
should have been liable to fall subject to it in a way that such authors
clearly expect their current reader not to.
Moreover, the problem here is not merely that this diagnosis
leaves work undone, it is also that it misses something in the
thought of past thinkers which ought to warrant more pause for
thought. It fails to notice a certain systematic element in the use of
the argument from illusion: that it is consistently used in relation to
sensory states and the context of perceiving properties, even where
no parallel argument is applied in relation to other mental states.
This point may have been obscured for some given a certain inter-
pretation of the views of certain past philosophers concerning the
nature of intentionality: that it required the introduction of inter-
mediaries for all cases of intentionality. On this view, the argument
from illusion as employed by Hume is simply an example of a spe-
cial case of this general attitude to thought and mental representa-
tion as applied to the case of perception. So, we ﬁnd in some
accounts of early modern philosophy the thought that a wide vari-
ety of philosophers, including Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche,
Locke, Berkeley and Hume all exemplify the ‘theory of ideas’ which
supposes that objects before the mind represent the world beyond
it.27 What could be a better expression of the view than the follow-
ing notorious passage from Malebranche:
I think everyone agrees that we do not perceive objects external to us
by themselves. We see the sun, stars, and an inﬁnity of objects exter-
nal to us; and it is not likely that the soul should leave the body and
stroll about the heavens, as it were, in order to behold all these ob-
jects. Thus, it does not see them by themselves, and our mind’s im-
mediate object when it sees the sun, for example, is not the sun, but
something that is intimately joined to our soul, and this is what I call
an idea. Thus by the word idea, I mean here nothing other than the
immediate object, or the object closest to the mind, when it perceives
27. This kind of interpretation has its origins in Reid, but for recent proponents see in partic-
ular (Bennett ).
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something, i.e., that which aﬀects and modiﬁes the mind with the
perception it has of an object.28
But one should resist imposing this conception of intentionality on
the early moderns in general. While there is common purpose
among these philosophers in talk of ideas (at least to distance them
from their scholastic predecessors), it is diﬃcult to discern any com-
mon theory of ideas across the tradition from Descartes to Hume.
Apart from Malebranche, one cannot easily locate a commitment to
a representative theory of ideas among the early moderns.29 Indeed,
in contrast to those philosophers who now take the paramount con-
cern of philosophy to deliver an appropriately naturalistic account
of intentionality, it is worth comment that in those times there
seemed to be so little concern with explaining the powers of the
mind to think about objects distinct from it.30,31
If we suspend judgement about the presence of a common theo-
ry of ideas, one can still ﬁnd used in diﬀerent authors to diﬀerent ef-
fect, a fairly common usage of either the argument from illusion or
the argument from conﬂicting appearances. While it is diﬃcult to
discover a systematic confusion about the nature of thought and
representation, it is fairly easy to discern a repeated use of the argu-
ment from conﬂicting sensory appearances or from illusion across
the centuries in diﬀerent intellectual contexts and put to diﬀerent
purposes.32
This suggests a separation of concern between thought and sense
28. (Malebranche ), The Search after Truth, Bk. , Pt. , Ch., p.. (I am not here endorsing
or rejecting this interpretation of Malebranche.)
29. One can ﬁnd such proponents in the pages of hostile critics: Berkeley represents the mate-
rialist as endorsing a representative theory of ideas, and Hume presents matters in much the
same terms. But the picture presented by Berkeley and Hume do not really ﬁt Locke’s explicit
pronouncements, so the relation between criticism and target is more complex than is often
presented in introductory accounts of British Empiricism. A more detailed discussion of the
relations here belongs elsewhere.
30. It is interesting to contrast (Fodor ), Ch. or (Fodor ) with Descartes’s discussion
of the objective reality of thought in the third meditation and Locke’s discussion of the origin
ideas in ‘An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing all things in God’. Where
Fodor takes the problem of intentionality to be the question of how to locate it within a natu-
ral, physical world, there is no apparent concern in either Descartes or Locke with the need to
explain powers of thought in terms of other aspects of the world—that there are ideas is some-
thing which is simply beyond serious question. (Although in Locke’s case, there is in addition
a scepticism about the possibility of explaining why the ideas that are occasioned by external
causes are so.)
31. The most concerted assault on this picture of early modern philosophy is in the work of
John Yolton, see in particular, (Yolton ); for more recent work in this tradition see (Nadler
). One may accept much of what Yolton says without endorsing his interpretation of Locke
as a ‘direct realist’, however. For more on this, see (Ayers ), Chs. -, and (Ayers ); for a
defence of a more traditional interpretation see (Chappell ).
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perception, and a speciﬁc cluster of assumptions or ideas associated
with the latter. That impression is surely reinforced when one reﬂ-
ects on the debate about sense-data in the early part of the twentieth
century. For example, when one looks at the work of Russell and
Moore, one ﬁnds both a concern with sense-data and a concern
with the nature of judgement and the possibility of true and false
judgement. If the inclination to take the argument from illusion se-
riously was simply a symptom of confusion about intentionality,
then one should expect parallel arguments and confusions in both
sets of debate. But for all the oddity of Russell’s and Moore’s various
diﬀerent theories of judgement at diﬀerent times, it is notable how
far their discussions of these matters are from the way in which they
treat the issues of the objects of perception.33 Likewise, in the case of
C.D. Broad, we ﬁnd a distinction drawn between the material and
epistemological objects of perception, which suggests some sensitiv-
ity to the special properties of thoughts and intentional states of
mind.34 And the point is made clearest in the work of H.H. Price: he
not only endorses the argument from illusion in a modiﬁed form,
but also emphasises the intentionality of perceptual experience,
which he calls perceptual acceptance—explicitly indicating that this
is a belief-like state of mind, in the process alluding to the work of
Reid and of Husserl.35
In none of these cases can we be content with the supposition that
the authors suﬀer from a general confusion about the notion of in-
tentionality which explains their endorsement of the argument from
illusion in the particular case of sensory states. In each case, we have
a contrast between the author’s treatment of thoughts and their
treatment of sensory states. In the ﬁnal example, we have someone
who accepts that experience has intentionality, but still supposes
that the argument from illusion generates a problem—for him, at
least, an intentional approach could not be thought adequate to dis-
32. Indeed, this is one of the points stressed most strongly in (Burnyeat ). Burnyeat also
oﬀers evidence for seeing Plato’s discussion of perception and knowledge in the Theaetetus in
terms amenable to the thrust of argument in the text: when Socrates ﬁnally rejects Theaetetus’s
identiﬁcation of knowledge and perception, part of the concern is to allow for the possibility of
false thought; but the separation of the two leaves intact the thought that it is impossible for
perceptions themselves to be false.
However, for a contrasting interpretation of ancient attitudes to intentionality, see
(Caston ), which links the problem of sensory error and error in thought in the interpre-
tation of Aristotle much more closely than I have suggested should be done in general here.
33. For useful discussions of various of Moore’s and Russell’s views on the nature of judgement
see, (Cartwright ), (Hylton ), (Baldwin ).
34. See (Broad ), Ch. IV.
35. (Price ), Ch.V, esp. pp. -.
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solve the problems of perception.
If we relied on the thought that the past attractions of the argu-
ment from illusion resided solely in a form of fallacious reasoning or
a general mistaken conception of intentionality, we would fail in our
understanding of past philosophy of perception in two ways. On the
one hand, we would simply be attributing a near self-evident mis-
take to past thinkers, without any explanation of why they should
have made such a mistake. The ancillary suggestion that past think-
ers are just confused about intentionality in general is not borne out
by the actual record. On the other hand, such a blanket interpreta-
tion ignores the systematic exploitation of the argument from illu-
sion in relation to sensory states, in contrast to the variety of
treatments of thought. An explanation of the past tradition needs to
ﬁnd more systematic structure in the viewpoint which takes the ar-
gument from illusion to present a genuine diﬃculty, we need there-
fore to look beyond the intentional fallacy to ﬁnd the relevant
assumptions peculiar to the sensory case.36
4.  The Hidden Assumption
Burnyeat in his survey of the arguments from conﬂicting appear-
ances and illusion claims that philosophers who use such an argu-
ment are in the grip of an ‘undeclared picture or model of what
perception is or ought to be like. It is an inappropriate picture…and
for that reason is not something a philosopher will readily acknowl-
edge, even to himself.’37 If correct, this would explain why Hume of-
fers us no explicit argument, and why many should have doubted
that any such explicit argument could be formulated: once the
premisses of such an argument are made explicit, they lose all at-
traction.
There is certainly some reason for thinking that this must be so.
It is one thing for the argument from illusion to impose on us the
positive claim that we perceive images along with external objects.
As surprising as this conclusion would be, we have learnt in other
areas that there is more to the world than we had previously antici-
pated. But as Hume is well aware, the negative half of the conclusion
does seem to conﬂict directly with a belief that is commonsensical
and that acts as one of Hume’s premisses, namely that we do per-
ceive such mind-independent objects as tables.
So the argument from illusion in Hume’s hands appears to have
36. Cf. here also Snowdon’s suggestion that we need an explanation of the psychological attrac-
tions of Hume’s and Price’s positions, (Snowdon ).
37. (Burnyeat ), p..
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the form of a reductio ad absurdum. But such a form of argument
can have suasive force, only if we ﬁnd its premisses more compelling
than the rejection of its conclusion. Since the relevant premisses
Hume must be employing are left unstated, there is no reason for us
to think such an assumption better grounded or more unshakeable
than the common sense thought that we perceive mind-independ-
ent objects. To make his assumptions explicit rather than implicit
would seem to dissolve the force of the argument entirely.
Burnyeat himself actually seems to go further than this. Starting
with an observation from Austin that no one seriously believes that
a straight stick has to look straight on all occasions it is viewed,
Burnyeat claims that proponents of the argument are indeed com-
mitted to that strange view. He takes the relevant added principle to
be the following:
() If something appears F to some observers and not-F to others,
then it is not inherently/really/in itself F.
As he then points out, this is equivalent to its contraposition:
() If something is inherently/really/in itself F, then it appears F
to all observers or it appears not-F to all.38
Ignoring the second disjunct of the consequent, this amounts to the
claim that Austin insists no one seriously believes. On the other
hand, Burnyeat notes that one can ﬁnd the principle stated in the
form of () only very rarely. This he takes to indicate that those at-
tracted to it are also wary of taking seriously its consequences. He
then takes the explanatory task to be one of showing the way in
which someone might come under the sway of certain metaphors or
models which would make the otherwise unappealing assumption
seem correct. In this case, the relevant model is what he calls the
‘window model’ of vision, which he characterises variously so:
…that we look through our eyes as through a window… ()The
window-pane should be transparent, without spot or blemish. Or
better, since Greek windows were unglazed, the eye should be an ap-
erture with no pane at all. There is as it were nothing between the
perceiver and the thing he perceives… () at the core of the percep-
tual experience there will be an unmediated knowing, like Moore’s
diaphanous awareness of blue, and when a suitable story has been
told about the objects of this knowing, the problem of conﬂicting
appearances is solved.()
We could then see the window model of perception as providing the
hidden premiss of Hume’s argument. The table cannot be the object
of awareness in a case of illusion, for given the model, the object of
38. Both op. cit. p..
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awareness must be as it appears to be, and ex hypothesi the table is
not as it appears; the image or impression must be the object of
awareness.   On this model whatever one is aware of must be as it
appears and only such an object is guaranteed to be as it appears.
At the heart of Burnyeat’s account is the thought that there can
be no rational explanation of why the argument has been found so
compelling. He criticises Austin (and no doubt would criticise the
authors cited in the last section) for attacking past philosophers
without according them due respect or trying to understand them.
But Burnyeat’s suggestion is that we understand them not by ﬁnding
appropriate grounds for the assumptions they make, but rather by
seeing how they may have been seduced by various errors, and by
recognising the same impulses in our own breasts:
Whether it is the ﬂawless close-up vision or the prehensive grasp,
whether it secures a whole object or only some part of the surface of
one or just a non-physical substitute for these, such pictures have
their origin in our earliest and deepest experience. If they elicited a
smile, it should have been a smile of recognition and not contempt.
For if, as Heraclitus advised, we remember our dreams, we will rec-
ognize that there was a time in our own lives when the problem of
conﬂicting appearances engaged our strongest feelings…39
Burnyeat’s aim here seems to be a form of philosophical pathology.
We are to recognise that it is part of the human philosophical condi-
tion to be swayed by a conception of perceiving which is simply in-
appropriate. Our respect for past thinkers is to be instilled in us by
our recognising the fact that we share a failing with them.
In fact, Burnyeat’s case here is somewhat overstated. While it is
true that we can ﬁnd no explicit statement of the required assump-
tion in Hume, in the twentieth century discussion of the immediate
objects of perception, authors have been less coy about explicitly
stating the assumption. Such explicit statement is often conjoined
with the admission that they lack any independent grounds for it.
Such candour is evidenced by H.H. Price when he writes:
When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain that I
am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or equally
plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This cannot in-
deed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable.40
And Howard Robinson, one of the few recent defenders of a sense-
datum conception of experience, happily identiﬁes the key premiss
of the argument from illusion as what he calls the Phenomenal Prin-
39. Op. cit. p..
40. (Price ), p..
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ciple:
If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses
a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the
subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality.41
Robinson sees it as the great advance of early twentieth century phi-
losophy of perception that the role of this assumption was made ex-
plicit in discussions of perception. Like Price, Robinson oﬀers no
direct argument for the principle, he takes it to be intuitively plausi-
ble, and defends it only by criticising what he takes to be rival ac-
counts of the nature of sensory experience.
How does Burnyeat’s strategy apply to Price and Robinson? Not
well, I suggest, and for two reasons. First, it is an important element
of Burnyeat’s strategy that we should suppose the relevant assump-
tions or model of perception are hidden or at least half-hidden. For
the problem, as he poses it, is that rational reﬂection will show that
the principle has unacceptable consequences and hence cannot be
endorsed. The only way the principle can retain its grip, on his in-
terpretation, is by not being revealed in rational light for what it is.
This ill-ﬁts Price, and indeed his contemporaries Moore and Broad,
all of whom are explicit that the argument from illusion relies on
just such an assumption for which they can provide no further justi-
ﬁcation, but which seems to them indubitable.42 So in relation to
such writers, Burnyeat’s strategy shows no greater respect than does
Austin’s: the targets of criticism must be so confused that we cannot
ﬁnd them readily intelligible.
Second, the cogency of Burnyeat’s strategy depends on the prob-
lem being one of historical interpretation of past ﬁgures with whom
we cannot conceive ourselves to be engaged in active debate. While
we can try to be engaged by their problems and their arguments, we
can also allow that there is a point at which we ﬁnd their assump-
tions or reasoning unintelligible or unsupportable by our lights.
There is no further task of debate, but simply one of understanding.
The latter, Burnyeat suggests, can be engaged in by seeing ourselves
as equally subject to philosophical illusion as our forebears, even if
we come to recognise it as illusion in a way that they failed. But
when we consider Robinson, and indeed other philosophers who
still explicitly endorse the traditional problem and forms of the ar-
gument from illusion, Burnyeat’s strategy is bound to seem inade-
quate.43 For we cannot pretend that we are not in debate with our
contemporaries. To say of them that they are simply in the grip of a
41. (Robinson ), p..
42. See, Moore (Moore ) and Broad (Broad ).
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false image expresses no more than our disagreement with them.
This is not to say that there is no problem here. Burnyeat is surely
right to highlight the deep disagreement involved. The question is
rather one of how to respond to the problem. One could simply
adopt the view of the past inherited from Austin, and from some
followers of Wittgenstein, which simply sees philosophical debate as
so immersed in confusion that there is no intellectually respectable
project of understanding to be undertaken here. All that one can do
is express one’s disagreement and distaste with past discussion of the
matter and those of one’s contemporaries who insist on pursuing
the matter. But here again, Burnyeat must be correct to insist that we
owe the past the respect of attempting to understand past views and
that it is a proper and genuine project for philosophers to under-
stand the reasoning and concerns of other times. The acute problem
for gaining such an understanding is simply that the shift has been
so immense: from a perspective in which the argument from illu-
sion frames the whole debate, to one in which the argument must be
rejected from the outset as evidently bad. At the same time, the time
scale for that shift has been so short: although the argument from il-
lusion has had a long history, it is only within the last thirty to forty
years that its place at centre stage of philosophical discussion of per-
ception has been overthrown. From our current perspective, it
seems near impossible to place us in a position where these argu-
ments could hold the same authority over our deliberations.
However, I suggest that the root of the problem is not quite
where Burnyeat suggests that it is. It is not that we have here people
under the sway of a philosophical illusion which needs uncovering,
but rather that we have a dispute which centres on the nature of ap-
pearances. The intractability of the debate simply reﬂects the para-
doxical nature of this type of problem. We have diﬃculty in making
sense of past philosophers here because the assumptions they make
about appearances are so diﬀerent from the ones that we are in-
clined to. The parties to the dispute disagree about the nature of ap-
pearances, while yet supposing that this nature is somehow obvious
to us, and hence beyond dispute. Since the parties do dispute the
question, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd any common ground among them. If
we are to make the debate tractable, we need to try and make sense
of how there can be dispute about the nature of appearances.
43. Cf.(Perkins ), (Foster ), (Maund ). One might also include (Jackson ):
Jackson explicitly disavows the argument from illusion, but not because of the principle here
under debate, but rather for independent issues concerning the role of subjective indistin-
guishability in the argument.
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5.  Grounding the Obvious
Our ﬁrst move is to show how we can make better sense of the de-
bate by seeing it strictly in terms of a dispute about how things ap-
pear to us. From that point we can move to the question of how
there can be such a dispute, and why we might end up with the dif-
ferent positions of sense-datum views and intentional theories.
That, in turn, raises an urgent question about the status of appear-
ances.
We can solve Burnyeat’s initial problem once we ask how Price
and Robinson could think that a controversial principle, which is
clearly not a self-evident truth, is still somehow intuitively correct,
or obviously right. The best explanation of their attitude is to see
them as supposing that while the principle is not self-evident, it is
nonetheless evident in the light of experience. If all one has to go on
is reﬂection on the proposition itself, then one cannot determine
whether it is true or not. But the proposition in question concerns
appearances, how things appear to one, and that one can test just by
reﬂection on how things do appear to one. Hence, simple reﬂection
on one’s own case should show one whether the principle in ques-
tion is true. So we might interpret Price and Robinson as supposing
that one’s self-conscious knowledge of sensory consciousness is suf-
ﬁcient to reveal to one the truth of the principle. Although not self-
evident, the principle is taken to be an obvious and indubitable
truth given how experience presents itself to us to be. Or so they are
convinced.
Certainly this line of interpretation helps to make sense of Hu-
me, and why the key premisses are missing from his argument. If a
relevant claim just seems so obviously true to one, then one will be
unlikely to bother to make it explicit or to attempt the fruitless task
of justifying it. Indeed, where a principle is so obvious, it is often ex-
tremely diﬃcult to consciously articulate it, and make explicit its
role in one’s reasoning. Rather than taking the lacunae in Hume’s
reasoning to be evidence of argumentative incompetence, we can
rather see it as evidence of how deeply embedded the relevant prin-
ciple is in his reﬂection on appearances.
Now, if the principle is thought to be evident in the light of expe-
rience, then the problem about justiﬁcation in the light of its unpal-
atable consequences is not so pressing. For even when faced with a
counter-intuitive conclusion, one cannot help but endorse the prin-
ciple (by ‘the natural light of reason’, so to speak), if one is con-
vinced that it is correct simply by reﬂection on what experience is
like. The option of modus tollens in the light of such an argument
will not arise. Suppose that introspection of experience gives con-
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clusive grounds for the problematic principle. Simply coming to
recognise unpleasant consequences of the principle needn’t by itself
alter the kind of experience one has, and hence won’t alter the sup-
port that the principle rests on.
But this, of course, does not solve the wider problem of interpre-
tation which Burnyeat raises. We may now understand how propo-
nents of the argument from illusion could take Robinson’s
Phenomenal Principle to be beyond justiﬁcation because they
thought it obvious in the light of reﬂection on experience. But this
moves the problem one stage back. We now need to understand how
they could have taken it to be obvious in just this manner. For, of
course, the mere fact that Anscombe, Searle, Harman and others
have thought that the principle is false, and have failed to ﬁnd any
justiﬁcation for it apart from the seductions of a certain fallacious
form of reasoning indicates that the principle cannot be obvious,
even were it true. So, why should those who take the argument from
illusion seriously think that experience shows the principle to be ob-
viously true?
If we leave that question on one side for a moment, and stand
back from the whole debate, we can see a suggestive parallel between
traditional sense-datum theories and some proponents of the inten-
tional theory. Both approaches appeal to what one can know about
appearances from introspection in support of their positions. We
have just noted how the sense-datum tradition makes such an ap-
peal. In the case of intentional theories of perception, the appeal is
in support of the link between experience and the mind-independ-
ent objects of perception. For example, Gilbert Harman thinks that
introspection supports his case in defending a form of the inten-
tional theory and at the same time creates a problem for the sense-
datum theory:
Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of
your visual experience. I predict that you will ﬁnd that the only fea-
tures there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented
tree, including relational features of the tree “from here”.44
Harman is conﬁdent that his readers will agree with him that initial
reﬂection on one’s visual experience will support the thought that
one encounters only mind-independent objects and their features
and how they relate to one when one introspects. There is a positive
and a negative side to the claim here: that one does encounter the
mind-independent world in experience; and that one encounters
nothing else. We might call the positive thesis Transparency: that the
44. (Harman ), p. .
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character of one’s experience involves in some sense, or is directed
on or of the mind-independent objects and their features which we
take to be around us in our environment.
While Harman thinks this evident, sense-datum theorists such as
Moore and Jackson, and their predecessors such as Hume, think it
wrong. So they do not suppose that the principle of Transparency is
obvious, given reﬂection on one’s experience. However, that it is not
to say that they think that experience obviously involves only mind-
dependent objects or features; rather, they suppose that experience
is neutral about these matters. As Hume puts it:
[the senses] give us no notion of continu’d existence, because they
cannot operate beyond the extent, in which they really operate. They
as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence, because they nei-
ther can oﬀer it to the mind as represented, nor as original… We
may, therefore, conclude with certainty, that the opinion of a con-
tinu’d and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses.45
And while Hume would agree with Harman that Harman’s view is
the view of common sense, since ‘the universal and primary opinion
of all men’ is that this table which we see is independent of the
mind, Hume is careful not to ground this belief in how appearances
strike us. The only explanation of the belief is that it is natural in us.
In this way, therefore, we can see the sharp discontinuity between
the older debate about sense-data and the objects of perception and
more recent discussions of the intentionality of experience as reﬂ-
ecting a deep disagreement about the nature of appearances. Since
there is a tendency on both sides to appeal to introspection to sup-
port their claims, there is a consequent diﬃculty in making sense
from either side of the view of the other, and equally a diﬃculty in
stepping back from the whole debate and ﬁnding some common
ground from which the disputants then move to their opposed posi-
tions. But we can make progress here, I suggest, by seeing how the
principles each side ground in introspection of experience can be
combined to reveal a possible position against which both of the tra-
ditions will be united in opposition.
The dispute between traditional sense-datum theories of percep-
tion and recent intentional accounts turns on two claims relating to
appearances, and not just one. Each side supposes that one such
claim is evidently true when one reﬂects on the character of experi-
ence, while the other side insists that reﬂection on experience nei-
ther shows the truth or falsity of that principle—while at the same
time, denying the principle in question. So neither side claims that
45.  (Hume ), pp.-.
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appearances themselves show the principle put forward by the other
side is false. The dispute about appearances is more indirect: wheth-
er they can oﬀer positive support for one principle or the other.
Now the two claims in question are not inconsistent with each
other. The claim of Transparency requires that experience be of
mind-independent objects and their features; while the claim of
Hume and the sense-datum theorists, which we might call Actual-
ism, requires that whatever qualities one senses, some actual in-
stance of those qualities and the object which bears them must exist
and be sensed. In combination they would simply require that when
one senses some quality, an appropriate mind-independent object
and feature should exist and be sensed by one.
Given the consistency of the two claims, one might hold that in-
trospection of one’s experience gives equal support to each of the
claims. Indeed, if we combine the two claims together we end up
with a position which seems very like the kinds of view the sense-da-
tum theorists labelled Naïve Realism, and which they took to be re-
futed by the argument from illusion. For, i f we accept the
Transparency of experience, we will suppose that the very mind-in-
dependent objects and qualities which we take ourselves to perceive
are aspects of what our experiences are like; while if we insist on the
Actualism of experience, we will accept that in having such experi-
ence, such objects and qualities will actually have to be there before
us. If I can see a table, and it looks to me as if there is a table there,
then what I sense is a table which exists independently of my mind,
and I could not so experience if the table were not there.
When I stare out of the window I can see the lavender bush at the
end of the street, the straggling rose on my fence, and I can hear the
sound of traﬃc in nearby roads. When I reﬂect on what it is like for
me so to experience, these very same objects and features remain the
focus of attention as aspects of how I experience: this commits me to
Transparency with regards to perception, as proponents of inten-
tional theories stress. At the same time, it is evident to me that I am
experiencing these things, and not merely thinking about them, or
imagining or remembering them. The latter things I can do in the
absence of the objects of perception, but it does not seem to me that
I can be this way, actually experiencing, without the relevant objects
or features present in my environment. This recommends Actualism
to me, as defenders of the sense-datum tradition have observed.46
So, if we take seriously the hypothesis that reﬂection on experi-
46. And not just proponents of the sense-datum tradition; compare Sartre’s discussion of the
phenomenological contrast between perception and imagination in (Sartre ).
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ence gives equal support to both Transparency and Actualism, then
we will think that such reﬂection ought to compel the acceptance
not of sense-datum views or intentional theories of perception but
rather of some kind of Naïve Realism. From this perspective, what is
notable about each of the main traditions is not what they seek to
defend by reference to introspection, but what they are prepared to
reject in the face of introspective support. The sense-datum tradi-
tion denies the manifest fact that it seems to us as if we are presented
in experience with mind-independent objects and states of aﬀairs in
the world around us. The intentional tradition denies the introspec-
tive evidence that things apparently sensed must actually be before
the mind for one to experience so.
From this perspective, the explanatory task is not to explain why
the sense-datum tradition thought that Actualism was an evident
truth, but rather why both the sense-datum tradition and intention-
al theories reject one or other aspect of Naïve Realism. In as much as
introspection gives support both to Transparency and Actualism,
one will ﬁnd no answer to this question by appealing to how our ex-
periences strike us as being. But one can easily ﬁnd reasons else-
where for rejecting this option. For here we ﬁnd a role for the
argument from illusion after all. Rather than thinking of it as a posi-
tive argument for the existence of sense-data, or for that matter for
the intentionality of experience, it is better to view it as an argument
against Naïve Realism.
When I stare at the lavender bush at the end of the street, it cer-
tainly seems to me as if I could not be this way without the bush re-
ally being there. On the other hand, it also seems quite clear to me
that for all I know, it is possible that I should be in a state of mind
which just by reﬂection I cannot distinguish from this state of mind
and yet in that case not be perceiving anything in the physical world
at all, but only be hallucinating. It is common to take this admission
as revealing something about the kind of state of mind, the kind of
sensory experience, one has when perceiving: that it is the kind of
state which could occur whether one is perceiving or hallucinat-
ing.47 Hence whether an experience counts as a case of perception
or hallucination tells us something about its aetiology but does not
determine its fundamental kind.
Now in a case of hallucinating a lavender bush just like this one, I
would be as inclined on the basis of introspection to assert that both
47. This assumption is rejected by so-called ‘disjunctive’ accounts of perception. For such
approaches see (Hinton ), and (Hinton ); (Snowdon -) and (Snowdon );
also (McDowell ); and (Putnam ).
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Transparency and Actualism were true of that experience. For, just
as in this case, it would seem to me as if I was presented with a piece
of ﬂora independent of my awareness, there in my environment re-
gardless of whether I was paying heed to it or not. Likewise, it would
strike me that what was distinctive of my situation is that things
could not be this way with me and no object be there at all. This is,
after all, a case of sensory experience and not thought. Nonetheless,
in such a situation there need be no appropriate candidate in one’s
environment, no lavender bush to catch one’s eye. So in such a case
of hallucination, it seems clear that at least one of the two principles
must be false. Either Transparency must be wrong and one is aware
of an object, just not one in one’s physical environment; or Actual-
ism must fail, and one’s experience does not require that there be an
object there.
The line of thought can be developed a bit further. If the same
kind of state of mind, the same perceptual experience, can occur
whether one is perceiving or having an illusion or suﬀering an hallu-
cination, then whatever principles hold of the hallucinatory experi-
ence must hold of the veridical perceptual experience too. So, if at
least one of the principles, Actualism or Transparency, must be false
of illusions and hallucinations, then that principle must be false also
of the corresponding veridical perception. The possibility of such
perfect hallucinations seems to show that Naïve Realism cannot be
true of any sensory experience.
More needs to be said here to develop this into a proper argu-
ment, but the idea that somehow the existence, or possibility, of per-
ceptual illusions is inconsistent with Naïve Realism is a familiar one.
We have already seen in the case of Hume, and adverted to with re-
spect to the sense-datum theorists, an appeal to the argument from
illusion to show that something like Naïve Realism is false. As the
quotation from Burge earlier indicated, while many philosophers
would now repudiate anything with the title ‘argument from illu-
sion’, they would not reject the bearing that illusions and hallucina-
tions have on giving an account of perceptual experience. So it is not
implausible to appeal here to some form of argument concerning il-
lusion to explain why Naïve Realism might be rejected.
 In addition, if we assume that, with proper attention, the char-
acter of experience is obvious to us, then when one attends appro-
priately to one’s experience one should be able to see that one of
these principles is not, after all, supported by introspectible evi-
dence. We should expect, therefore, a theorist who is moved by this
line of argument not only to reject one of the principles but also to
deny that it is seemingly correct to someone who reﬂects on their
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experience.
But now, one might point out, if in fact introspection supports
each principle equally, then there is no introspective evidence to
lead one to reject one principle rather than the other. So we are not
to explain the disagreement across the traditions of debate by refer-
ence to diﬀerent kinds of experience that the disputants enjoyed, or
to their diﬀerent powers of introspection. The argument from illu-
sion might lead one to the commitment that one of the two princi-
ples must be wrong, and if wrong not evidently supported by
introspection, but nothing yet will show which to reject. That now
leaves the way open for us to explain the disagreement in terms of
other aspects of the two traditions’ intellectual contexts.
If, in fact, there is nothing about introspected experience per se
which should lead one to reject or endorse Actualism rather than
Transparency, there are plenty of other philosophical concerns
which separate typical sense-datum theorists from defenders of in-
tentional theories. Some of these are suﬃcient to explain why one
might antecedently be inclined to repudiate Transparency while up-
holding Actualism, or alternatively be inclined to excoriate Actual-
ism and embrace Transparency.
Consider ﬁrst Hume’s intellectual context. Notoriously within
the early modern tradition, common sense realism is taken to be
problematic. In digesting the new science, one comes to question
the status of sensible qualities such as colours and tastes, and the
true nature of grossly observable elements of the world around us.
In some ﬁgures, one ﬁnds a commitment to realism at odds with
common sense—for example, in Descartes we witness the down-
grading of the senses as a source of knowledge of the nature of the
world, and instead an emphasis on the role of intellect. In Berkeley,
on the other hand, we see an attempt to hold onto the most precious
aspects of the sensible world, at the cost of rejecting a material and
mind-independent world.
Hume’s discussion in ‘Scepticism with regard to the Senses’ is
sensitive to the distance these opposing approaches are from the
views of the vulgar. For if it can be a matter for serious debate
whether the world is as it is presented to us by the senses, then one
will not suppose the matter settled simply by introspection. Yet, if
Actualism and Transparency can be shown to be true and certain
simply by reﬂection on one’s experience, then that would be the
outcome. For, were the combination of these two true, then the cor-
rectness of common sense realism would simply be obvious to us,
and hence beyond dispute. So the rejection of Transparency seems
naturally to cohabit with the problematic status of such realism. It is
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symptomatic of the thought that the world is properly to be de-
scribed only through a developing scientiﬁc discipline that the sens-
es reveal to us much less about the nature of the world than we are
vulgarly inclined to suppose.
If we move forward in time to the early twentieth century discus-
sions of sense-data, we ﬁnd relevantly similar concerns about real-
ism. While one ﬁnds an opposition to the idealism of late nineteenth
century, common sense realism is taken to be no less problematic
than in early modern times: one of the central concerns is to explain
how we place the mind in a world of the form described by then
current science. Equally importantly, and again echoing the early
modern period, there is no reason to resist the consequences of Ac-
tualism which in certain cases of illusion and hallucination will lead
to a commitment to non-physical objects of sense. For the idea that
the physical world must be causally complete, with purely physical
events having suﬃcient causal explanation in terms of purely physi-
cal antecedents, is not a doctrine accepted on faith and without
question. Rather the unity of science and the mind’s place in nature
are taken in many such discussions to be open. For example, at this
time we ﬁnd serious discussion of the para-psychological as a realm
governed by psycho-physical laws uninvestigated by then current
science.48
These intellectual concerns contrast sharply with much of the
dominant philosophical ideology of the last forty years. One of the
most notable developments since the middle of the last century has
been the ascendancy of a commitment to physicalism in some form
or another. In particular, in discussions of mind there has been a
concern to avoid any commitment to the existence of peculiar, and
distinctively mental, entities. An acceptance of Actualism would
lead one to accept the existence of non-physical objects of sense in
the case of hallucinations and some illusions, and so would appar-
ently lead one to conclusions in conﬂict with physicalism.49 If one
already has reason to reject Actualism through a prior endorsement
of physicalism, then the considerations about illusion and the gen-
eral unreliability of the senses do not by themselves give one any
reason to dispose of Transparency as well. Even if common sense re-
alism is taken to be controversial or to be false, one will simply think
that this reﬂects a way in which our experience of the world is more
48. It is worth noting that both Broad and Price professed a serious interest in the parapsycho-
logical.
49. Cf. here (Smart ), (Armstrong ); (Tye ). Some philosophers dispute whether
there is a conﬂict between physicalism and sense-data, cf. (Cornman ) and (Perkins )
for a discussion of this.
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or less accurate. Only the combination of Actualism and Transpar-
ency would commit us to the deﬁnite truth of common sense real-
ism. Indeed, the more ﬁrm one’s commitment to Transparency, the
more implausible Actualism can be made to seem. One may be
more inclined to accept that a non-physical mosaic of colours must
exist whenever one has a visual experience than to accept that some
non-physical table or rabbit should so exist because one’s experience
presents such entities. So the more reason one has to insist that ex-
perience really is as of tables and rabbits, the more evident it will be
that Actualism cannot be true.
Given the implications of the considerations about illusion and
hallucination, one ﬁnds a conﬂict between Actualism and Transpar-
ency internal to the problem of perception. Other intellectual pro-
clivities, in favour of, or sceptical towards, physicalism and realism
about the empirical world, explain one’s antecedent inclination to-
wards one of the principles rather than the other. When the focus is
on the problematic status of common sense realism, and minims is
not assumed, Actualism can be taken to be secure and to deﬁne the
options. When some of form of physicalism is beyond question, Ac-
tualism is highly questionable, and an insistence on the correctness
of Transparency reinforces any reasons for thinking of experience as
intentional in nature.
These suggestions oﬀer us a strategy by which we can resolve our
problem of interpretation. At ﬁrst sight, the shift between the tradi-
tional problems of perception discussed by sense-datum theorists
and recent accounts of perception has been so large that it is diﬃcult
to see how there can be a common concern here. Equally in looking
back from our current perspective it is diﬃcult to make sense of the
early tradition as a cogent piece of reasoning about the senses. If we
take seriously both the suggestion that the diﬀerent views seek for
support in the character of appearances, and that these diﬀerent
views get equal support from introspection of experience, then the
disagreement becomes easier to comprehend. Underneath the ap-
parent diﬀerences of approach, there is a common thread and a
common problem: ﬁrst reﬂection on experience recommends Naïve
Realism to one; then, considerations which may loosely be tied to-
gether under the heading of ‘the argument from illusion’ suggest
that no such view can be correct. The sense-datum tradition and in-
tentional approaches are just alternative responses to this problem.
If experience does support the key principle of each view equally,
then we are not to explain the diﬀerences between them, the rejec-
tion of one principle rather than the other, directly in terms of the
evidence that they have available about the introspectible character
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of experience. At the same time, by taking a broader perspective and
looking at other aspects of the intellectual context, we can see why
certain thinkers would be predisposed to the rejection of Transpar-
ency or of Actualism.
6.  Conclusion
Over the past few pages we have focused on three questions. The
most speciﬁc is that of how we should make sense of the argument
from illusion as evidenced in Hume’s First Enquiry. This reﬂects the
second and more general question of how we are to make sense of
past debates about perception which seem to be framed in such dif-
ferent terms from those in play in recent discussion. In answer to
these questions I suggested that we should take seriously the hy-
pothesis that introspection recommends to us naïve realism as the
proper account of our sensory experience. Rather than seeing the
argument from illusion as a positive argument intended to show the
existence of certain strange entities, impressions or sense-data, we
should see the considerations about illusion or hallucination as in-
tended to show the falsity of the view commended by introspection.
As indicated above, this helps make the argument from illusion
more intelligible by inserting further premisses to make the argu-
ment valid, while indicating appropriate grounds for accepting the
relevant assumptions. Moreover, with the extra premisses in play, we
can see an answer to the second question. Far from the argument
from illusion being merely an outmoded form of argument belong-
ing to an old tradition of debate about the problems of perception,
we can see recent intentional approaches to perception tacitly em-
ploying the very same concerns. Both sense-datum theories and in-
tentional approaches reject naïve realism and arguably do so for the
same set of reasons concerning illusion and hallucination. This fact
is obscured by superﬁcial dissimilarities in terminology and focus.
There are diﬀerences between the two traditions, of course. Pro-
ponents of the intentional approach are inclined to assert the trans-
parency of experience and to ridicule the principle Actualism; sense-
datum theorists are happy to insist that Actualism is an indubitable
truth, while questioning whether there are suﬃcient grounds for en-
dorsing Transparency. So the two traditions seem to be in direct dis-
pute about what should be most obvious to us. Hence these
diﬀerences lead us to the third question with which this paper start-
ed. How can there be dispute about appearances, if it is right to as-
sume that the nature of appearances is simply obvious to us all? The
answer suggested here is that the diﬀerences and disputes between
the two traditions do not in fact belong to anything that can be in-
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trospected about our experience. Each side should agree that our ex-
perience seems to us to be naïve realist in character. When they
disagree about the real nature of perceptual consciousness, the sto-
ries told above suggest that each party is moved by intellectual con-
cerns beyond those which can be extracted simply from reﬂecting
on the obvious character of experience itself.
That leads us to look to three consequences of the tale just told. It
is fairly common now to claim that the mind-body problem has a
central role within philosophical debate. More particularly that the
central question philosophers face is the diﬃcult one of seeing how
minds such as ours could be no more than a part of the physical
world around us. The discussion above lends some support to this
thesis. If the explanation of the diﬀerences in the terms of debate
about perception is right, then we can understand recent writing
about perceptual experience only in the context of certain broad, if
not always explicit, physicalist assumptions. However, it should be
noted that these framing assumptions join with a much older set of
philosophical problems, the problems of perception, which can and
have been posed against a rather diﬀerent background of metaphys-
ical assumptions. We should be wary, therefore, of supposing that
the only philosophical agenda that one should address in relation to
the mind is that of the mind-body problem.
Indeed, one will take this moral more seriously if one reﬂects on
some of the ways that the recent debate might be accused of distort-
ing the discussion of perceptual consciousness. Such discussions
tend to contrast qualia and phenomenal states of mind with states
which have a representational content, and suppose that there can
be little in common between phenomenal states on the side and
propositional attitudes on the other. Against this background, one
cannot but feel sympathy with Richard Rorty’s complaint that 
The attempt to hitch pains and beliefs together seems ad hoc—they
don’t seem to have anything in common except our refusal to call
them “physical”.50
And it is no surprise, in the light of an assumption that the phenom-
enal lacks any representational content and intrinsic structure, that
theorists of consciousness have sought to deﬁne consciousness prin-
cipally in terms of accessibility to thought.51
It seems to me that such theories are far removed from phenom-
50. R. Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ) p. .
51. See in particular, S. Shoemaker, ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”’, Philosophy & Phenom-
enological Research, , pp.-; D. M. Rosenthal, ‘A Theory of Consciousness’ (Report no.
/, Centre for Interdisciplinary Research [ZiF], Research Group on Mind and Brain, Uni-
versity of Bielefeld).
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enology—perhaps, here I speak only for myself, but I have at least
the suspicion that the inner lives of others are as complex, troubling
and diﬃcult to articulate as my own. It is no surprise that one may
end up with the feeling that the explananda have been lost in the
construction of the theory, when confronted with most discussions
of the phenomenal and consciousness.
I suggest that we can understand such distortions in the theory
of consciousness through a combination of an implicit recognition
of the intuitive appeal of Actualism with a wish to avoid any com-
mitment to ‘the theatre of mind’. So, we ﬁnd philosophers endorsing
the feeling that with genuine sensory states, in contrast to mere
thoughts, there must actually be some qualities distinctive of the
sensory state, qualia, while rejecting the idea that there must be
sense-data as inner objects of awareness. The tension is reconciled
by an appeal to qualia as mere qualities of a state of mind, which al-
leviate the pull towards Actualism, without being taken to be objects
of awareness. However this advantage is gained at the cost of the
theoretical account becoming completely divorced from giving a be-
lievable story about the apparent structure of perceptual conscious-
ness, for which the theory is supposed to be an account.
The distortion in how one characterises the phenomenological
aspects of the mind arises when one takes physicalism not only as a
plausible end point in one’s discussion of the mind, but as a starting
point in deﬁning the phenomena with which one will deal. It is only
when we pay due attention to the attractions of naïve realism, and
face up explicitly to the challenge posed by illusion and hallucina-
tion, we shall be in a better position to construct a theory of percep-
tual consciousness.
This leads to the ﬁnal moral with which to end. So far, the ac-
count oﬀered has been hypothetical. If we make the interpretive
leap, and suppose that sense-datum theorists take introspection to
support their position, and if we make sense of that in turn by sup-
posing that introspection most directly supports naïve realism, then
we have an answer to the three questions above. However, nothing
has yet been done to show directly that this latter hypothesis is cor-
rect. But suppose that we do have reason to endorse this suggestion,
then the way in which we view the problems of perception should
alter radically. From the perspective of naïve realism, the problem of
perception does not principally concern our knowledge of the exter-
nal world, so much as our understanding and knowledge of our own
sensory states. The sense-datum theory conﬂicts with how our sen-
sory states seem to us, to the extent that that theory posits non-
physical objects as the objects of awareness in the having of experi-
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ence, despite the fact that introspection recommends Transparency
to us. The conﬂict here is not so much with the positing of non-
physical objects of awareness as the assumption that these objects
play the role in awareness that introspection would lead us to sup-
pose that the mind-independent objects of perception play. Like-
wise, the intentional approach conﬂicts with naïve realism.
According to intentional theories, the manner in which objects are
present to the mind in sensory experience is consistent with the
non-existence of the putative objects of awareness. If there is intro-
spective support for Actualism, then it seems to us for some aspects
of our experience as if we couldn’t be so without the objects of
which we are aware genuinely being there. So where a sense-datum
account of perception conﬂicts with a naïve view of what objects can
be given in experience, an intentional view conﬂicts with a naïve
view of how those objects are given to us in experience.
Once we recognise that introspection supports naïve realism,
rather than directly recommending either a sense-datum view or an
intentional account, then we are faced with the consequence that at
least some experiences will be misleading about their own nature.
Consider an hallucination indistinguishable for me from a veridical
perception. If in the case of veridical perception it seems to me that
Actualism and Transparency hold, just given reﬂection on what the
experience is like, then in introspecting the matching hallucination,
the two principles will seem to hold as well. However, in just such a
case at least one of the two principles must be false. So given intro-
spective support for naïve realism, at least some states of being ap-
peared to must be misleading not only about the world, but as
paradoxical as this may sound, also about themselves.
Given the assumption that the nature of appearances must really
be obvious to one given suitable reﬂection, this conclusion may well
seem absurd. One might think that what it is for something to be an
aspect of how one is consciously experiencing things is for it to be
open to knowledge simply through reﬂection on the state. One may
insist that unlike one’s knowledge of the external world, when it
comes to conscious experience there is no room for a distinction be-
tween how things seem to one and how they really are.
However, our discussion suggests that despite the prevalence of
this assumption, the argument from illusion illustrates that it is not
tenable. Sense-datum theorists may seek to hold on to the assump-
tion by insisting that it really does not even seem to us as if Trans-
parency is true of our experiences, and intentional theorists may
insist that there is no introspective support for Actualism. In both
cases the mirror-image position undermines these protestations.
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The only way that we can make proper sense of the development of
the debate is to accept that there is at least some prima facie support
for the opposing position. Once one arrives at that position, then
one cannot hope to show on the basis of introspection alone that
one’s preferred principle is manifestly correct and the other lacks
proper support. And that means that in the end we must accept that
appearances are not entirely obvious in their nature.
The central problem of perception, therefore, is to address the
argument from illusion and the conﬂict between it and the claims
philosophers have been prompted to make about the nature of ex-
perience on the basis of introspection of it. The problem of making
sense of how there can be debate about appearances has become the
problem of making sense of how we can be mistaken about them.52
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